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This paper summarizes the findings from the first randomized evaluation of a job training program
in Latin America. Between 2001 and 2005 the government of the Dominican Republic operated a
subsidized training program for low-income youth in urban areas. The program featured several weeks
of classroom instruction followed by an internship at a private sector firm.  A random sample of eligible
applicants was selected to undergo training, and information was gathered 10-14 months after graduation
on both trainees and control group members. Although previous non-experimental evaluations of similar
programs in Latin America have suggested a positive impact on employment, we find no evidence
of such an effect. There is a marginally significant impact on hourly wages, and on the probability
of health insurance coverage, conditional on employment.  Finally, we develop an operational definition
of the impact of training on "employability" in the context of a dynamic model with state dependence
and unobserved heterogeneity.  Consistent with our main results, we find no significant impact of the
training program on the subsequent employability of trainees.
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  During the 1990s the Inter-American Development Bank financed a series of 
innovative training programs throughout Latin America targeted at less-educated youth – 
a group that faces considerable barriers to labor market success in developing and 
developed economies.
1  Drawing on lessons from the Job Training Partnership Act in the 
U.S. and the Youth Training Scheme in Britain, the programs combined classroom 
training with a subsequent internship period of on-the-job work experience.
2  Unlike 
earlier training schemes in the region, the programs also placed a heavy emphasis on the 
private sector, both as a provider of training and as a demander of trainees. Private 
training contractors were encouraged to participate in the provision of training through a 
competitive bidding process.  Proposals for training programs had to be backed by 
commitments from local employers to offer internships of at least two months duration. 
  Among the IABD-sponsored programs, the Juventud y Empleo (JE) program in 
the Dominican Republic was unique in incorporating a randomized design to allow for a 
highly credible evaluation of the program’s effects.  This paper summarizes the impacts 
of  JE on a wide range of labor market outcomes, including employment, hours of work, 
and hourly wages.  We also use a simple dynamic model of labor market transitions to 
estimate the impacts of JE on the “employability” of trainees,  and on their ability to find 
and hold jobs with health insurance coverage. 
                                                 
1 See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) for a general overview of training programs, and Betcherman, 
Olivas and Das (2004) for a recent summary that includes some evaluations of developing country training 
programs. 
2 The Job Training Partnership Act program is described extensively by Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 
(1999).  Dolton, Makepeace and Treble (1994) describe the Youth Training Scheme.   1
  Our analysis is based on a sample of  program participants from the second cohort 
of the JE program who received training in early 2004.
3  Baseline data were collected 
from a registration form completed by program applicants prior to randomization.   A 
follow-up survey was administered in the period from May to July of 2005, 10 to 14 
months after most trainees had finished their initial course work.  Simple experimental 
comparisons between the people who received treatment and those in the control group 
suggest a negligible impact on employment, although there is some indication of a 
possibly larger impact in certain regions of the country.  The lack of an overall effect is 
confirmed by our dynamic models, which show very small effects on employment 
transition rates.  In contrast to the small effects on the likelihood of work, we estimate 
that JE increased the average monthly earnings of participants by about 10%, although 
the effects are imprecisely estimated and only marginally significant.  
  A brief literature review follows this introduction, focusing on previous findings 
for similar programs, particularly in Latin America. The specifics of the program are 
presented in section 3. The data and basic statistics are described in section 4. Section 5 
presents the results, and conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
2.  Previous Research on Labor Market Training Programs 
  Few public policies have been studied and evaluated as rigorously as job training 
programs.
4  Most of the existing evidence is derived from programs in the United States 
and Europe.  In the U.S. case, particularly credible evidence is available from randomized 
                                                 
3 The first JE cohort was a smaller, pilot cohort, for which information was not collected in a rigorous and 
systematic manner.    
4 Among the earliest evaluation in the economics literature are the studies by Ashenfelter (1978) and Kiefer 
(1979).  Subsequent studies include the important paper by Lalonde (1986), which emphasized the case for 
the use of randomized experiments in training program evaluations.     2
evaluations of the Job Partnership Training Act (see Bloom et al., 1997;  GAO, 1996; 
Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 1999), the Job Corps (Burghart et al. 2001),  and a series 
of programs for welfare recipients (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins, 1997).  One 
conclusion that emerges from the U.S. and European literature is that the impacts of job 
training are generally modest, at best. A second key finding is that the effectiveness of 
training varies with the characteristics of  participants and the type of training.  For 
example, many studies have concluded that women benefit more from training than men.
5  
On-the-job training is often thought to be more effective than classroom training, 
although this is by no means a universal finding.
6  Voluntary programs are generally 
found to be more effective than mandatory programs (Friedlander, Greenberg, and 
Robins, 1997).  Finally, in the case of work experience programs, private sector programs 
are found to be more effective than public sector programs (Kluve et al, 2006). 
  With respect to youth, randomized evaluations from the two main programs 
serving disadvantaged youth in the U.S. –  the Job Partnership Training Act (JPTA) and 
the Job Corps – yield quite different results.  The short-run impacts for young women in 
JPTA are essentially zero (although the longer-term impacts appear to be more positive – 
see GAO, 1996), while the short-run impacts for young men are negative.  In contrast, the 
Job Corps had a significantly positive effect on both genders.  Lee (2005) for example, 
shows that Job Corp had about a 12 percent effect on earnings three years after training.   
  The European evidence is far more uncertain (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 
1999) in part because of the lack of experimental studies and the wide variation in 
                                                 
5 See Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997). 
6 See Heckman, Hohmann, Khoo and Smith (2000).   The Job Corps –a largely classroom training program 
for disadvantage youth– has been found to be relatively effective: see Burghardt et al. (2001).   3
evaluation methods.
7  Nevertheless, one key finding that emerges from the meta-analysis 
by Kluve et al. (2006) is that programs serving youth are substantially less likely to show 
positive impact effects than programs for adults. 
  Evidence on the effectiveness of training in developing countries is more limited.  
Betcherman, Olivas and Amit Dar (2004), for example,  review 69 impact evaluations of 
unemployed and youth training programs, only 19 of which are in developing countries.  
Of those 5 are specific to youth training -- all in Latin America.  Betcherman et al. (2004) 
conclude that training impacts in Latin America are more positive than the impacts of 
programs in the United States and Europe.
8   Likewise, Ñopo and Saavedra (2003) 
analyze a sample of training programs in Latin America and conclude that employment 
and income impacts of the programs tend to exceed the impacts in developed countries.
9 
  While there are a number of existing studies of training programs in Latin 
America, to the best of our knowledge all of these have used non-experimental  methods 
– most notably propensity score matching methods.  And the positive results 
notwithstanding, as in European case the variability in methods and data have produced 
widely varying results, even for the same program. A case in point is Peru’s youth 
                                                 
7 The British YTS case is emblematic of this dispersion in results. Studies such as Main and Shelley (1990) 
and Main (1991) document positive results on short-term employment in the neighborhood of 11-17 
percent. On the other hand, studies such as Whitfield and Bourlakis (1990) find smaller impact on 
employment, of 4 percent, while Dolton et all (1994) find negative impacts on employment of between 4 
and 17 percent.  In a recent meta-evaluation of active labor market programs, which is based on a sample of 
95 impact evaluations across European countries, Kluve et al (2006) found a tendency for “overly 
optimistic” results in the non-experimental evaluations. 
8 All of these evaluations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay) correspond to youth programs that 
have common features with the Dominican Republic program.  
9 Weller (2004) also looks at Latin America training programs, but in the context of all active labor market 
programs.   4
training program: seven evaluations have produced a very wide range of estimated 
impacts for this program.
10  
  Two other problems are common in much of the literature, and are shared by our 
evaluation of the JE program.  First, few studies present estimated impacts beyond two or 
three years post-training. In the case of Latin America, existing evaluations tend to focus 
on impact after 12 or 18 months. As a result, there is considerable uncertainty about the 
persistence of training effects.
11   A second limitation is the paucity of information on 
program costs, and of other possible program effects, such as general equilibrium 
spillover or “crowding” effects (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003).  
 
3.  LAC Training Programs and Juventud y Empleo 
a.  Background Context 
  Job training programs traditionally played a central role in active labor market 
policies of the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. During the era of import-
substitution growth policies, many countries adopted a centralized model for training 
provision, organized through a national training institute (NTI).
12 Program content was 
usually dictated by NTI’s, and services were targeted to more highly skilled workers who 
were already employed in the sectors favored by the import substitution growth strategy.  
  Since the abandonment of the import-substitution model in the early 1980s, the 
role and modus operandi of the NTI’s have been re-evaluated.  NTI’s have been under 
                                                 
10 These evaluations used data generated for different cohorts. The estimated earnings impact 6 months 
after treatment ranged from 12% to 60%. Impact at after 18 months ranged from 13% to 40%.  
11 A notable exception is the JPTA evaluation.  The GAO obtained data for five years after random 
assignment (GAO, 1996).  These data have unfortunately never been released to other researchers. Longer 
term data are also available for the British YTS program.  Dolton (2004) tracks beneficiaries 11 years after 
the training was completed. 
12 NTI’s in this era included SENA in Colombia, SENAI in Brazil, SNPP in Paraguay, INFOTEP in 
Dominican Republic,SENATI in Peru and INAFORP in Panama.    5
pressure to adopt a “demand-driven” model of training, based on a separation between 
the financing, planning, and delivery of training services, and the active participation of 
local employers in the selection of providers and program content. 
  Two influential programs, the Mexican PROBECAT, which started in 1984, and 
Chile Joven, which started in 1992, have laid the groundwork for this new generation of 
programs.  In PROBECAT, trainees often receive classroom training in the firms where 
they carry out their internships.  Variants of this “Mexican model” were adopted in 
Central America (Honduras and El Salvador for example) during the late 1990s.  Under 
the alternative “Chilean model,” trainees generally receive technical/vocational training 
at an independent provider, followed by an internship at a private sector firm. Variants of 
this plan were adopted in Venezuela and Argentina during the mid 1990s, and in Peru, 
Colombia, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic in the late 1990s.  
 
b.  Juventud y Empleo – Basic Design 
  Juventud y Empleo (JE) was developed and implemented by the Government of 
the Dominican Republic with financial support from the IADB. The first phase of the 
program – which ran from 2001 to 2006 – was targeted to low-income youth (ages 18 to 
29) with less than a secondary education (i.e. no more than 11 years of completed 
schooling) who were not currently enrolled in school.  Special attention was directed to 
enrolling women.  The stated objective of the program was to increase “employability” of 
the lowest income members of the working age population by facilitating access to the   6
labor market through training and counseling. According to the program design mandate, 
this was to be achieved by tailoring program content to the needs of local employers.
13 
  Following the principles of the “Chilean model”, the Ministry of Labor 
outsourced the provision of training services to private training institutions (Instituciones 
de Capacitación – ICAPs).  Courses (with a maximum duration of 350 hours) were 
conducted in the ICAPs’ facilities and split into two parts: basic skill training, and 
technical/vocational training.  Basic skills training was meant to strengthen trainees’ self 
esteem and work habits, while vocational training was customized to the needs of local 
employers. 
  ICAPs were selected through a competitive process. Proposals from potential 
training providers were required to include written commitments from one or more firms 
to offer a two-month internship to all trainees graduating from the provider’s program.   
This was supposed to ensure that the ICAP was offering training that would be of value 
to local employers.
14  The original project design also required ICAPs to follow-up on the 
trainees during the internship period to provide counseling and technical assistance. In 
practice, this follow-up was limited.  
  All potential training providers were required to present training proposals for the 
courses they would offer.  The proposals were evaluated and revised by the National 
Institute of Technical and Professional Training (Instituto Nacional de Formación 
Técnica Profesional - INFOTEP).   INFOTEP was also contracted to inspect the selected 
                                                 
13 See “Reform and Labor Training Program” Project Document (1183/OC-DR). Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
14 It should be noted that, during program execution, delays occurred between the presentation of bids by 
the ICAPs and the awarding of contracts. By the time trainees graduated, many of the firms that had 
originally signed an internship agreement with the ICAPs were unable to offer the number of internships 
initially promised. Therefore, a large proportion of graduating trainees were matched with internships 
offered by different firms than those originally contacted by the ICAPs   7
ICAPs before any training took place, and during the training courses.  Much less 
frequently, ICAP personnel also visited some of the firms that were providing 
internships.  
  Trainees were not paid during the program, but the program did provide a partial 
reimbursement of transportation costs and meals, up to a maximum of  50 Dominican 
Pesos per day (roughly two dollars).  The daily stipend was well below the market wage 
rate available for a typical trainee, who earned about 4,500 Pesos per month in the post-
training follow-up survey (more than four times the stipend). The program also provided 
insurance against accidents on the workplace for all trainees.   
 
c.   Implementation 
  The original JE design specified that individuals interested in receiving training 
would submit applications through a local employment office of the Minister of Labor, 
where personal information would be gathered and checked against eligibility rules 
before being sent to a central office for random assignment.  In practice, the local offices 
did not have the capacity to perform this function, and the enrollment task was taken on 
by the ICAP’s.  Staff from the Ministry of Labor and the ICAPs conducted outreach and 
information programs in the poor neighborhoods of the larger urban centers of the 
Dominican Republic, informing people about the availability of the training courses. The 
outreach effort included “perifoneo” (announcements by vehicle-mounted loudspeaker), 
radio advertisements, and contacts with churches and other community groups. 
  Applicants for a training position completed a short survey that gathered 
information on their age, education, and employment status.  This information was then   8
used to determine eligibility.  Some of the eligibility requirements (e.g., unemployment 
status and education achievement) were hard to verify, and the rules were apparently 
known by applicants, leading to reporting problems that we discuss in more detail below.  
Once a group of 30 eligible applicants was recruited, the ICAP submitted the list of 
names (selected on a first-come, first-serve basis from the list of those who met the 
eligibility criteria) to the Ministry of Labor, which randomly selected 20 names to receive 
training.
15  The other 10 were assigned to the control group. ICAPs were allowed to 
reassign up to five people from the control group to the treatment group, in the event that 
one or more of the original treatments failed to show up for training (“no-shows”) or 
dropped out within the first two weeks of the course (“dropouts”).  No-show and dropout 
rates were relatively high, and over one-third of the original control group was reassigned 
to treatment status. 
  For the second cohort of the JE program, information was submitted by the 
ICAP’s for a total of 8,391 eligible applicants who were applying to receive training in 
early 2004. Of these 5,802 (69.1%) were originally assigned to the treatment group, and 
2,589 (30.9%) were assigned to the control group.  A total of 1,011 of the treatments 
were either dropouts or no-shows, and 966 original members of the control group were 
re-assigned to the treatment group.  Thus, a total of 1,623 people remained in the control 
group, while 5,757 (=5802-1011+966) were in the treatment group and received at least 2 
weeks of training.  We refer to these as the “realized” control and treatment groups, 
respectively. 
                                                 
15 The original program design called for three treatment groups and one control group.  The three 
treatment groups would have received (i) training and no internship, (ii) internship and no training, (iii) 
both.  Due to the difficulties in implementing this scheme the program was simplified to have only one 
treatment and one control group.   9
  
4.  Basic Data Description 
a.  The Evaluation Sample 
  Although baseline information was collected on all applicants to the JE program, 
follow-up information was only collected for a subsample of the “realized” treatment and 
control groups.  This subsample was drawn by stratified sampling (using age, gender, and 
education classes as strata) from administrative lists of the realized treatment and control 
groups,  and includes 563 controls and 786 treatments.
16   
  The fact that data were collected from the realized treatment groups, rather than 
the initial program assignment groups, is potentially problematic.  The most serious 
difficulty is that lack post-program information on people initially assigned to treatment 
who failed to show up for training, or dropped out less than two weeks.  Unless the 
incidence of dropout and no-show behavior is random, the outcomes of the remaining 
members of the treatment group may over-state or under-state the average value of 
training.  To assess the likely magnitude of this problem, we present an analysis using the 
baseline survey data on all originally assigned trainees and controls in the second cohort 
of the JE program in the next section. A related concern is that people re-assigned from 
the control group to the treatment group may have been non-randomly selected.  Given 
the nature of this process and available program documents, however, we believe that re-
assignment was essentially random.   
  Originally, the follow-up survey was scheduled to be conducted 6 months after 
completion of the classroom segment of the training.  In practice, however, the survey 
                                                 
16 From now on we refer to these as “treatment” and “control” groups.  The size of the evaluation sample 
was determined to meet a minimum precision requirement for the difference in means of the employment 
rates between the treatment and control groups.   10
was conducted between May and July of 2005.  As part of the survey, members of the 
treatment group were asked to provide monthly information on their activities, starting 
from the month that they completed (or left) their classroom training program.  Because 
of variation in the date of entry into the program, and variation in the duration of 
classroom training, the number of months of post-classroom training data available for 
members of the treatment group ranges from 1 to 18, with a median of 13 months.
17  
  Information on the treatment group members who completed the follow-up survey 
enables us to estimate the fractions of the trainees in JE who completed the various 
phases of treatment.  A total of 93.3% of the realized treatment group completed their 
classroom training, while 6.7% did not. Of the completers, 84.8% started an internship.  
Finally, of those who started the internship 92.4% completed it.  Thus, the completion 
rate for the entire classroom and internship program was 74% (=.933 × .848 × .924), 
which compares favorably with other training programs.
18  
  An important complication that arises in the post-program survey is that since the 
control group members did not enter training, they could not be asked about their 
activities in the time since program completion.  Instead, members of the control group 
were asked to provide a monthly calendar starting from August/September 2004.  Thus, 
for members of the control group, we have access to information on roughly 7-9 months 
of data over the period from September 2004 to May-July 2005.   
                                                 
17 For 2.9% of trainees the survey was conducted less than 6 months after course completion; 14% were 
surveyed 6-9 months after; 21.6% between 10-12 months after; and 61.5% were surveyed 13 months or 
more after course completion.  
18 Note that the treatment group is defined as those who completed at least two weeks of classroom 
training.  If no-shows and early dropouts are included in the calculation of the completion rate, it falls to 
60%, which is still relatively high.  
   11
  For the dynamic analysis described in Section 5, we make one further adjustment 
to the sample.  Specifically, to ensure that comparisons of the treatment and control 
groups are not affected by the fact that some treatments were still in classroom training, 
for the dynamic analysis we limit attention to the subgroup of the treatments in the 
follow-up survey who had completed their classroom training (or dropped out) by 
September 2004.
19  Using this criteria we identified a set of 651 members of the treatment 
group (82.8% of the treatment group included in the evaluation sample).   We refer to the 
sample comprising all 563 controls in the follow-up sample and the 651 treatments in the 
follow-up sample that completed their classroom training by September 2005 as the 
“dynamic sample”. 
 
b. Basic Sample Characteristics and Tests for Randomness 
  Table 1 shows some basic characteristics for members of the (realized) treatment 
and control groups, as well as for a comparison group in the general population taken 
from the October 2004 labor force survey.
20   We include information collected in the 
baseline (eligibility) survey completed by all program applicants (denoted as “baseline” 
characteristics in the table), as well as information on selected characteristics collected in 
the follow-up survey.  
  Looking first at the differences between the treatment and control groups, there 
appears to be only small and unsystematic differences between the groups. For both 
groups the mean ages are about 22.3 at baseline, and 22.8 at the follow-up survey.  The 
regional distributions of the treatments and controls are also similar, as are the fractions 
                                                 
19 The date of ending classroom training has to be imputed for early dropouts. 
20 This group was defined in terms of age (16-29, mimicking the program’s eligibility criteria) and region, 
limiting the sample to those living in the same provinces in which the program operated.   12
who are male, the mean levels of schooling of both parents, the fractions who report 
receiving remittances (at either baseline or follow-up), the fractions employed at baseline, 
the fractions with previous work experience, and average household size.  The only 
notable exception is the distribution of schooling, where – despite the similarity in mean 
years of schooling – the treatment group appears to have a lower fraction of people with 
primary education and a higher fraction with secondary schooling than the control group.  
Given the patterns for parental education, and for years of schooling, we suspect that the 
slight differences in the fractions with primary versus secondary education are accidental, 
rather than the result of a failure of randomization, or of the fact that the groups are based 
on realized program group status, rather than initially assigned status.
21   
  Although the comparisons in Table 1 between the realized treatment and control 
groups suggest that these two groups are very similar, we conducted an additional 
analysis using data from the baseline survey that are available for everyone in the second 
cohort of the JE program.  Specifically, we compared the characteristics of four 
subgroups, defined by the combination of initial program assignment and realized 
assignment: (1) those who were originally assigned to treatment and were either no-
shows or dropouts; (2) those who were originally assigned to treatment and actually 
received treatment; (3) those who were originally assigned to the control group and did 
not receive treatment; (4) and those who were originally assigned to the control group but 
were re-assigned to treatment.  A sufficient condition for realized program group status to 
be “as good as random” is that the classification into these four groups is random.   
                                                 
21 To test randomization more formally, we ran a probit model for being in the realized treatment group on 
all the baseline characteristics, as well as the follow-up survey characteristics that are arguably unaffected 
by treatment (parental education, location).  We then conducted a test for the joint significance of the 
covariates, which should be insignificant if assignment is random.  The statistic is insignificant when 
education is measured in years, but marginally significant if it is measured in categories.    13
  Appendix Table 1 presents the means for a set of descriptive statistics for the four 
groups.  Looking across groups, there are few obvious differences by status.  The only 
characteristic that clearly stands out is age: no-shows and dropouts were somewhat more 
likely to be age 20-24, and less likely to be age 25 or older, than the other groups. 
  To test the hypothesis of randomness more formally we fit a multinomial logit 
model for being in each of the four groups, using the age, gender, education, and family 
status of the applicants, and interactions of these variables, to predict assignment/realized 
status. The results are summarized in Appendix Table 2. The likelihood ratio test for the 
hypothesis that all the coefficients of the model are 0 is statistically significant, 
suggesting that the covariates have some predictive power.  In particular, it appears that 
some of the age effects and their interactions are statistically significant, although the 
pseudo-R
2 is tiny.  This finding suggests that we have to be cautious in inferring the true 
effect of the JE treatment from comparisons between the realized program group and 
realized control group. 
   In view of theses results, in the comparisons below we present both “unadjusted” 
comparisons of the mean differences between the two groups, and a reweighted 
difference, which uses the method described by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to 
“balance” the distribution of the characteristics of the two groups.
22  This is a simple 
semi-parametric alternative to a regression adjustment which will lead to unbiased 
estimates of the experimental impacts based on realized treatment group status under the 
assumption that that no-show/dropout behavior was random, conditional on the observed 
                                                 
22 In brief, the method is as follows.  Step 1: estimate a logit model for the probability of being in the 
control group as a function of the baseline and time-invariant characteristics measured in the follow-up 
survey.  Step 2:  construct weighted means for the treatment group, using as a weight for a given person the 
function p/(1-p), where p is the predicted probability he or she is in the control group.     14
covariates, and that re-assignment from the control group to the program group was also 
random, conditional on the observed covariates.   Results from a regression adjusted 
comparison are quite similar and in the interests of simplicity we report only the 
unadjusted and reweighted comparisons.  
Relative to the comparison group of same-aged people in the October 2004 Labor 
Force Survey (ENFT), members of the experimental sample are a little less likely to be 
male, consistent with the stated objectives of the program.  People in the experiment also 
tend to have less-educated parents than those in the overall population.  Most noticeably, 
people in the experiment have lower employment rates and previous work experience (as 
measured in the baseline survey), reflecting the eligibility requirements of the program. 
  A third interesting set of contrasts in Table 1 is between responses to similar 
questions at the baseline and follow-up surveys.  For example, in the baseline survey no 
one in the treatment or control groups reported having post-secondary education, whereas 
in the follow-up both groups report a 12% rate of post-secondary education.  We suspect 
that this discrepancy reflects under-reporting by applicants who were aware of the   
eligibility criteria of the program (which specified less than a high school degree for 
eligibility).  A similar under-reporting phenomenon could explain the higher fraction of 
the sample with reported remittances at the follow-up than at the baseline.
23   
Results 
a. Employment  
  The main goal of the JE program was to increase the “employability” of 
participants.  Hence, a natural yardstick for assessing program success is a comparison of 
                                                 
23 The remittance question at baseline refers to 2002, while the question in the follow-up survey refers to 
2004, and in the ENFT to July-September 2004.  We suspect that timing differences cannot account for the 
rise in remittance rates between baseline and follow-up.   15
the post-program employment rates of the treatment and control groups, which, under the 
assumption of random assignment is an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect. 
Table 2 reports the employment rates for both groups, as well as the raw and weighted 
difference. The results clearly show no program impact on participant employment rate
24: 
at the time of the follow-up survey 57% of individuals in treatment group were employed 
versus 56% of those in the control group.  The results from the reweighted comparison 
are even closer to 0.  When we disaggregate the results by gender, age, education and 
region none of the estimated employment impacts are statistically different from 0 at 
conventional levels.  Nevertheless, the point estimates are positive and large enough to be 
economically significant for the youngest age group (17-19 years old), and for those in 
the East and Santo Domingo regions.   
  While the main focus of the JE program was on employment, it is also interesting 
and important to consider the effects of the program on earnings.  To explore these 
effects, we begin by looking at monthly labor earnings and hours per week.
25  Table 3 
shows total monthly labor income for the two groups, assigning 0 earnings for non-
workers. Members of the treatment group have monthly total labor earnings which are 
RD$484 (or 17%) higher than the control group.   While this is a large effect, it is 
imprecisely estimated, reflecting the small samples sizes and the underlying variability in 
earnings.  Examining various subgroups, the estimated earnings impacts are larger for the 
youngest age group and for residents of Santo Domingo.  The impacts also seem to be 
                                                 
24 The employment rate is computed at the time of the follow-up survey (May - July 2005). Even 
controlling for the month of application and for the month of graduation/separation, there are no significant 
differences between the employment status of treatments and controls. 
25 Additionally, we also examine whether the quality of the job was different as measured by having health 
insurance. Those results are discussed in the dynamic analysis.   16
larger for those with some secondary education (a 21% impact versus a 9% for people 
with only primary education).  
  Table 4 shows the impacts on hours worked per week. Consistent with the results 
on the probability of employment, there do not seem to be large or systematic effects on 
hours of the overall sample or any subgroup.  Interestingly, for many groups the 
estimated effects of JE are negative, though uniformly insignificant. 
 
b. Conditional Impact on Workers 
  Given the negligible impact on employment and hours per week, but the positive 
effects on earnings, it is interesting to look at how the JE program affected hourly wages.  
As pointed out in Lee (2005), a comparison of hourly wages in an experimental setting is 
problematic when the intervention affects the probability of work. In the case of JE, 
however, the program appears to have had no effect on employment, implying that wage 
comparisons between the groups are potentially valid.
26  Table 5 presents results for the 
overall experimental population. The top row simply reproduces the employment impact 
from Table 2.  The remaining rows show means of income, hours worked, hourly wages, 
and the probability of health insurance, conditional on working, for the treatment and 
control groups, as well as the unadjusted and adjusted (reweighted) gaps between them.  
The JE program appears to have had a marginally significant 10% impact on the hourly 
wages of participants.  No significant differences exist either in hours worked per week 
                                                 
26 Formally, people who report wages are a selected subset of the population, and, if the experiment effects 
the probability of working it may change the relative amount of selectivity bias in the observed wages of 
the two groups.  Lee (2005) presents an informative procedure for bounding the size of any wage effects, 
when there is an employment rate difference.  When there is no employment difference, and employment is 
assumed to be governed by a single index selection model, simple (unadjusted) comparisons of wages are 
valid.   17
(conditional on working) or in the probability of obtaining health insurance through the 
primary job, though the point estimates of the insurance effect are positive. 
  Tables 6a and 6b conduct the same exercise for different subgroups.  Table 6a 
shows the unadjusted data, whereas 6b shows results using the reweighting procedure to 
standardize the characteristics of the treatment group back to those of the controls.
27   
Across the various subgroups there is no evidence of a significant effect on hours 
(conditional on working).  Likewise, although most of the point estimates are positive, 
none of the estimated effects on hourly wages are significant.  We conclude that the 
suggestive positive effects on wages seen for the overall sample in Table 5 are relatively 
evenly distributed across the sample.   
  Although the estimated impacts on hourly wages and earnings are not statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the point estimates (around 10%) is relatively large.  In 
particular, the estimated impact on average monthly earnings of those with a job is about 
RD$440 – or about 38 US dollars per month – with a t-statistic for the adjusted gap of 
1.5.  The estimated cost of the JE program was about 330 US dollars per trainee.  Taking 
the point estimate at face value, assuming that the employment rate of the trainees (and 
controls) remains at 55%, and that impact on earnings conditional on employment 
persists indefinitely, and the initial investment in training costs would be recovered in 
about two years.  Unfortunately, given the imprecision of the estimated earnings impacts, 
and the absence of longer-term follow-up data, it is impossible to reach a definitive 
conclusion on the cost-effectiveness of the JE program. 
                                                 
27 Note that the first row of Table 6a corresponds to the third column of Table 5 (raw differences), and the 
first row of Table 6b corresponds to the last column of Table 5 (reweighted differences).   18
  
c. Quality of the Training Institutions 
  A natural hypothesis about training programs is that higher quality training will 
have a bigger impact on participant outcomes.  Information on the quality of different 
ICAPs was obtained from a supervision system set up by INFOTEP (the National 
Training Institute). For each ICAP we know whether or not it was a member of the 
INFOTEP network, and if so, the quality grade assigned by INFOTEP for the institution.  
Of the 33 ICAPs contracted for training in Phase 1 of the JE program, 22 were certified 
by INFOTEP and 11 were not (however, 80% of trainees attended a certified ICAP).  
Among the certified ICAPs, 10 received the minimum grade, 6 received a medium rating 
and 3 received the maximum rating.
28  We tried to test whether the impact of training was 
related to the “quality” of the ICAP by dividing enrollees into those who were assigned to 
ICAPs with different INFOTEP ratings (treating non-members as a fourth category).  To 
account for local variation in other unobserved factors that may be correlated with 
quality, we assigned the controls to the ICAPs they would have trained with, if they had 
been in the treatment group.  Comparisons between treatment and control outcomes 
within each quality group showed no evidence of a large or systematic “quality effect”. 
 
d. Dynamic Employment Impacts 
  So far we have examined the impact of the program at the time of the follow-up 
survey, which took place between May and July 2005. In this section we focus on 
employment dynamics, specifically monthly employment outcomes between August 
                                                 
28 The share of trainees – among those who enrolled with a certified ICAP-- was 37% at ICAP’s with low 
rating, 50% at those with medium rating and 8% at those with a high rating.    19
2004 and May 2005.  As noted earlier, for this purpose, we limit the sample of treatment 
group members to those that finished or dropped out of the course on or before August 
2004.   This creates a “balanced” panel of individuals for whom we observe monthly 
employment status from August 2004 until May 2005. 
  Figure 1 shows monthly employment rates for the treatment and control groups 
during each month of this ten month window, along with the difference in employment 
rates for each month, and a 95% confidence interval around the difference.  We present 
data for the overall sample (top left panel) and for some of the key subgroups in the 
experiment.  As suggested by the estimated employment impacts at the time of the 
follow-up survey (in Table 2), there is no indication of an overall treatment effect, but 
there is some indication of positive employment effects for the youngest sample 
members, and for those in the East region.   
  We also conducted a similar analysis using information on the dynamic path of 
the likelihood of having employer-provided health insurance (i.e., being employed at a 
job that provides health insurance coverage). We interpret this variable as a rough 
indicator of the quality of the job held at a point in time. (Unfortunately, the surveys did 
not collect monthly wage data).   Figure 2 shows the fractions of people in the treatment 
and control groups with employer-provided health insurance each month, along with the 
experimental impact (and a 95% confidence interval).  Overall, the treatment group has 
about a four percentage point higher coverage rate than the control group (19.5% vs. 
15.5%), and the gap is marginally significant over most of the post-training window.  
However, the difference is present only for men; it is negligible for women.  Although 
the estimates are quite noisy, the effect seems to be concentrated among better-educated   20
sample members (with a secondary education) and among those living in Santo 
Domingo. 
 
e.  A Model of Impacts on “Employability” 
  The designers of the JE program specified “increased employability” as an 
objective of training.  One interpretation of this concept is that training would raise the 
probability of moving from unemployment to employment, and lower the probability of 
moving from employment to unemployment. Building on this interpretation, in this 
section we develop a simple dynamic model of monthly employment outcomes in the JE 
evaluation, to determine whether participating in the program had an impact on either 
probability.   We also use a similar model to examine the effects of the JE program on 
transitions into and out of jobs with employer-provided health insurance. 
  The model consists of two parts: one for the person’s employment status in 
“month 1” (August 2004) – which we interpret as a period just after the end of training – 
and another for the rate of employment transitions over the next 9 months.
29  In this 
setting, the JE program has two types of potential effects: an effect on employment status 
in month 1, which could be negative if training takes someone out of the labor force, and 
an effect on the subsequent transition probabilities.  
  To proceed, let yit represent the employment status of person i in month t, let Xi 
represent a set of observed baseline covariates for individual i, and let Ti be a dummy 
indicating i’s program status (Ti =0 for a control group member and Ti  =1 for a program 
group member). The statistical problem is to develop a model for 
                                                 
29 Some of the issues in specifying treatment effects in a dynamic setting are described in Ham and Lalonde 
(1996) and Card and Hyslop (2005).   21
 P(  yi1, yi2, .... yi11 | Ti, Xi ) = P (yi1 | Ti, Xi ) × P( yi2, .... yi11 | yi1 , Ti, X i )  
We assume that there is unobserved heterogeneity across the population, represented by 
the random effect αi.  Under random assignment, the distribution of the random effect is 
the same in the treatment and control groups.  
  In the absence of the JE program we assume that in months 2-10, the probability 
that person i is employed in month t depends on αi, on a linear trend (capturing the 
upward trend in employment we observe in the data from months 1-10) on the X’s, and 
on employment status in the previous month: 
 P(yit=1 | yit-1, Ti=0,  Xi, αi) = P( β0 +  β1 t  +  Xiβx +  λyit-1 +  αi   +  eit  ≥0 ) 
where eit is a logistic random variable that is i.i.d. over time and across people.  This 
implies that  
 P(yit=1 | yit-1, Ti=0, Xi,  αi.) =   logit (β0 +  β1 t  +  Xi βx +   λyit-1 + αi) 
where logit(z) = exp(z)/(1 + exp(z)) is the logistic distribution function.   
  For people in the treatment group we assume that exposure to treatment 
potentially increases "employability".  This is captured by two treatment effects: a 
potential increase in the probability of being employed in period t if the person was not 
working in period t-1 (i.e., an increase in the rate of moving from non-work to work), and 
a potential increase in the probability of being employed in period t if the person was 
working in period t-1 (i.e., an increase in the rate of job retention).  Formally, we assume 
that 
 P(yit=1 | yit-1, Ti=1, Xi, αi) = logit (β0 + β1 t + Xi βx +  λyit-1 + ϕ0(1-yit-1)   
                      +  ϕ1yit-1  +  αi) .   22
The parameter ϕ0 represents the effect of the JE program on the probability of moving 
from non-work to work, while ϕ1 is the effect on the probability of job retention.  
  We assume that the distribution of the random effects can be approximated by a 
point mass distribution with a small number (3) points of support.  Thus, αi is a random 
variable that takes on values {α1, α2, α3} with probabilities {π1, π2, π3}.  We jointly 
estimate the location of the mass points and their probabilities.
30 Finally, we assume that 
the probability that the individual is employed in August 2004 is given by  
 P(yi1=1 | Ti,Xi,αi) =   logit (  γ(αi) +  µ Xi βx   + δTi  ) 
where γ(αi) = γj (for j=1,2,3) represent unrestricted constants for each point of support of 
the random effect, µ is a scalar parameter that "rescales" the effects of the X’s in the 
initial conditions probability model, and δ represents the treatment effect on the 
probability of employment in month 1. 
  We fit a number of versions of this model to the sequences of monthly 
employment outcomes of the treatment and control groups, including models without any 
covariates, and other specifications with controls for various combinations of gender, age, 
education and region.  Estimates from a representative specification are presented in 
column 1 of Table 7.  This model includes three observed characteristics: a dummy for 
males, a dummy for ages 20-24, and a dummy for ages 25 and older (with the omitted 
category being ages 17-19).  The main parameter estimates are very similar from 
specifications with no covariates, or with a longer list of controls.   In column 2, we also 
                                                 
30The use of a point-mass distribution to approximate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity was 
popularized in econometrics by Heckman and Singer (1984).  Our model is similar to ones used in Card 
and Sullivan (1988) and Card and Hyslop (2005). 
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show estimates from a parallel specification fit to the sequence of indicators for having a 
job with employer-provided health insurance. 
  As one might expect, the parameter estimates from the two models are similar, 
though there are some interesting differences.  Consistent with the patterns in Figures 1 
and 2, the model in column 1 of Table 7 has a positive trend, while the trend in the model 
for employment with insurance is negligible (see row 2). Males are more likely to be 
employed in any month, or to be employed at a job with insurance (row 7).  Likewise, 
older workers have higher probabilities of employment or employment with health 
insurance (rows 8-9).  The estimates of the “loading factor” µ (row 10) suggest that the 
covariates combine in a similar way to affect the probabilities of employment in months 
2-9 and in month 1.   Finally, both outcomes exhibit significant state dependence: the 
estimate of λ is 4.67 for employment and 7.00 for employment with insurance. 
  Given the absence of a large or systematic gap in the employment rates of the 
treatment and control groups (Figure 1) it is not surprising that the estimated treatment 
effects for employment are small and imprecise (rows 4-6).    The point estimates suggest 
that any treatment effect is concentrated on the job retention rate, though the t-statistic is 
only about 1.  The estimated treatment effects for the probability of having a job with 
health insurance are larger, though still relatively imprecise.  Training appears to have 
raised the probability of holding a job with health insurance during August 2004 (“month 
1”), as well as the rates of moving into a job with insurance, and holding onto such a job. 
  Some further insight into the predictions of the dynamic model for health 
insurance coverage are presented in Figure 3.  This figure shows the actual difference 
between the treatment and control groups in the likelihood of a job with insurance (shown   24
by the black squares), as well as the predicted differences from the model (the heavy 
line).  We also show the predicted difference under the assumption that treatment only 
affected the “initial condition” in month 1 (the dashed line), and under the assumption 
that treatment affected the initial condition and the probability of retaining a job with 
health insurance (the lighter solid line).   Looking at month 10 (i.e., May 2005) the 
predicted treatment effect is around 4.5 percentage points, of which about 2 points can be 
attributed to the impact of treatment on health insurance status in month 1, another point 
can be attributed to the impact of treatment on the likelihood of retaining a job with 
insurance, and the remained (about 1.5 points) can be attributed to the treatment effect on 
the likelihood of moving from no insurance to insurance.  The relatively large 
contribution of the initial insurance status in month 1 suggests that training helped the 
trainees move to better jobs almost immediately – perhaps through employment at the 
firm that offered on-the-job training.  Nearly one-half of the overall effect on the 
likelihood of holding a job with health insurance at the end of the follow-up period is 
attributed to this initial condition effect. 
 
5.  Interpretation and Conclusions  
  This paper presents the first evaluation based on an experimental design for a job 
training program in Latin America.  Previous evaluations of similar programs, based on 
observational designs, typically report positive impacts of training on the probability of 
having a job and on labor earnings. In contrast, we find that the Juventud y Empleo (JE) 
program in the Dominican Republic had no significant effect on employment. There is 
evidence of an modest (10%) impact on hourly wages and earnings per month   25
(conditional on employment), although the estimated effects are only marginally 
significant (t=1.5 for monthly earnings).  The point estimate is economically significant, 
and large enough to potentially offset the costs of the JE training in about 2 years, if the 
impact persisted. 
  Although our evaluation is based on  a randomized design, in the implementation 
of the experiment some people who were initially assigned to training dropped out, and 
were not included in the survey of post-program outcomes.  Our analysis suggests that 
dropouts were not very different than those who completed training, and we use a re-
weighting procedure to adjust the available samples of trainees and controls for minor 
differences in their observed characteristics.  It is possible there is some remaining bias in 
our experimental contrasts, arising from unobserved differences between the dropouts 
and those who completed training, although we believe theses biases are probably small. 
  This paper also contributes to the literature by providing an operational definition 
for “employability”, based on transition probabilities between employment and non-
employment status.   Building on this definition, we fit a logistic model with state 
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity for the observed employment transitions of the 
treatment and control groups.  The results of the model suggest that the JE program had 
no significant impact of trainee employability, although a similar model shows a modest 
impact on job quality, as measured by the probability of holding of a job that offers 
health insurance. 
  Our finding that the Juventud y Empleo training program had (at best) relatively 
modest effects on participants’ labor market outcomes is consistent with the results from 
evaluations in many developed countries. Although it may be possible to improve the   26
effectiveness of the JE program in the Dominican Republic, and similar programs in 
other Latin American and Caribbean countries, it is unlikely that programs of this nature, 
operating under similar financial and operational constraints, can fully address the many 
barriers and problems faced by disadvantaged youths in the region.  In any case, the 
results from this evaluation suggest that it is important that job training programs be 
closely tracked and rigorously evaluated.
31 
                                                 
31 The Office of Evaluation and Oversight at the IDB is currently working on five quantitative impact 
evaluations of similar programs, including a natural experiment in Panama and quasi experimental designs 
for Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Colombia.    27
Appendix Table 1: Comparisons of Characteristics Between Four 
Assignment/Realized Treatment Status Groups 
 
Variable    
Assigned to 











        1 2 3 4 
Female    0.545 0.570 0.534 0.528 
Years  of  Schooling    9.255 9.083 9.171 9.459 
Primary    0.324 0.386 0.374 0.274 
Age    22.246 22.368 22.136 22.034 
Student    0.351 0.305 0.403 0.437 
Married    0.186 0.215 0.201 0.170 
Dependants    0.192 0.193 0.213 0.181 
Remittances    0.033 0.035 0.040 0.037 
Letrina    0.252 0.274 0.217 0.216 
Santo  Domingo    0.539 0.553 0.507 0.467 
Household  Members    4.872 4.826 4.781 4.939 
Age  17-19    0.240 0.239 0.231 0.254 
Age  20-24    0.505 0.492 0.546 0.510 
Age  25+    0.254 0.269 0.223 0.236 
Labor  Experience    0.151 0.148 0.159 0.164 
Employed      0.028 0.025 0.025 0.016 
          
N      4791 1623 1010  941   28
 
Appendix Table 2: Tests for Randomness Between Four Assignment Groups 
 
Multinomial logistic regression    Number of obs  =  8365 
     LR chi2(63)  =  117.17 
     Prob > chi2  =  0 
Log likelihood = -9464.0928    Pseudo R2   =  0.0062 
              
   Control No  Show/Dropouts Control-Replacement 
Variable  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
Female    0.057 0.144 0.286 0.186 0.136 0.182 
Years of Schooling  0.009 0.027 0.060 0.034 0.052 0.036 
Household  Size  -0.009 0.015 -0.027 0.019 0.016 0.019 
Married  (M)  0.050 0.208 0.069 0.253 0.139 0.257 
Primary  (P)  0.078 0.171 0.307 0.219 -0.160 0.233 
P*F  -0.037 0.128 0.088 0.153 -0.130 0.168 
Age 20-24 (A20)  -0.156  0.130  0.406 0.173 0.182 0.164 
P*M  0.086 0.160 -0.273 0.194 0.011 0.220 
No.  Dependents  (D) -0.268 0.186 0.220 0.226 -0.049 0.232 
P*D  0.287 0.157 0.162 0.187 0.154 0.212 
D*F  -0.119 0.169 -0.117 0.200 0.050 0.216 
M*F  0.132 0.197 -0.057 0.228 -0.227 0.243 
Age 17-19 (A17)  -0.299  0.154  0.506 0.196 0.116 0.188 
A17*P  0.455 0.177 0.001 0.226 0.185 0.238 
A17*M  0.173 0.256 0.163 0.351 0.286 0.328 
A17*D  0.222 0.264 -0.423 0.360 -0.106 0.338 
A17*F 0.070  0.182  -0.601 0.230 -0.089 0.227 
A20*P  0.098 0.149 0.114 0.185 0.115 0.205 
A20*M  -0.160 0.169 0.264 0.204 -0.040 0.222 
A20*D  0.283 0.165 -0.057 0.197 -0.089 0.213 
A20*F  0.065 0.152 -0.362 0.191 -0.241 0.193 
              
Note: Multinomial logit model for assignment/realized treatment status.  Omitted group is the 
set of originally assigned trainees who completed training. 
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Table 1: Basic Characteristics of the Sample 
  Treatment Control  Comparison
      Group  Group  Group** 
Age (in Years): 
  At Baseline  22.3 22.3  -- 
  At Follow-up              22.8  22.8  22.1 
Geographic Distribution: 
   East  16.0  13.0  7.1 
   North  18.8  16.7  32.9 
   Santo Domingo  44.0  45.3  50.0 
   Southwest  21.1  25.0  10.1 
 
Percent Male  44.7  42.8  49.0 
 
Parental Education: 
   Schooling of Father (years)  6.9  7.2  9.4 
   Schooling of Mother (years)  7.0  6.9  9.3 
 
Distribution of Completed Education      
At Baseline: 
    Years of Schooling   9.3  9.2  -- 
    Primary*  30.7  36.9  -- 
    Secondary*  69.3  63.1  -- 
At Follow-up: 
     Years of Schooling  10.7  10.5  9.6 
     Primary *  15.5  22.7  37.1 
     Secondary *  72.1  64.8  45.2 
     Post-secondary  12.3  12.4  17.7 
 
Receive Remittances: 
  At Baseline  3.3  4.1  -- 
  At Follow-up  24.7  20.6  8.0 
      
Employed (Baseline)  3.1  3.4  48.9 
Previous Work (Baseline)  17.7  15.8  58.8 
Household Size   5.0   5.1   4.7 
      
* Denotes statistically significant difference between treatment and control groups in 
   this variable. 
** Based on October 2004 ENFT (Labor Force Survey) for the provinces were the 
training program was offered, for overall population ages 16-29. 
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Table 2: Employment Status at the Follow-up Survey 
 
      
      Raw  Re-weighted 
Sample: Treatments  Controls  Difference  Difference 
          
All 57.38% 55.95% 1.43% 0.02%
   1.77% 2.09% 2.74% 2.74%
          
Men 70.94% 70.54% 0.40% -0.77%
   2.43% 2.94% 3.81% 3.85%
          
Women 46.44% 45.03% 1.41% 0.28%
   2.39% 2.78% 3.67% 3.65%
          
Ages 17 - 19   50.37% 42.59% 7.78% 6.93%
   4.32% 4.78% 6.45% 6.35%
          
Ages 20 - 24   59.12% 57.64% 1.48% -0.10%
   2.37% 2.92% 3.75% 3.80%
          
Age 25+  58.26% 61.68% -3.42% -4.46%
   3.35% 3.77% 5.05% 5.00%
          
Primary Education  56.85% 57.21% -0.37% -1.99%
   3.20% 3.44% 4.70% 4.59%
          
Secondary Education  57.61% 55.21% 2.40% 1.16%
   2.12% 2.64% 3.38% 3.43%
          
EAST 61.90% 53.42% 8.48% 6.95%
   4.34% 5.88% 7.25% 7.50%
          
NORTH 60.14% 67.02% -6.89% -6.70%
   4.04% 4.88% 6.39% 6.41%
          
Santo Domingo  58.67% 53.33% 5.34% 4.13%
   2.65% 3.13% 4.09% 4.09%
          
SOUTHWEST 48.80% 54.61% -5.81% -7.46%
   3.89% 4.21% 5.73% 5.60%
        
Notes: standard errors in italics.  In the last column, the mean for the treatment group is a 
weighted mean, where the weight for a given person is p/(1-p), and p is the estimated 
probability the person is in the control group, given his/her covariates.   31
Table 3:  Labor Earnings in the Month of the Follow-up Survey 
      
      Raw  Re-weighted 
Sample: Treatments  Controls  Difference  Difference 
          
All $3,236 $2,752 $484  $273
   $146 $150 $215 $208
          
Men $4,750 $4,107 $643  $456
   $251 $262 $373 $366
          
Women $2,014 $1,739 $276  $135
   $146 $153 $215 $207
          
Ages 17 - 19   $2,680 $1,826 $854  $619
   $343 $321 $479 $444
          
Ages 20 - 24   $3,267 $2,865 $402  $228
   $188 $209 $287 $285
          
Age 25+  $3,518 $3,157 $362  $128
   $306 $284 $429 $403
          
Primary Education  $2,890 $2,654 $236  $21
   $238 $250 $346 $328
          
Secondary Education  $3,389 $2,810 $579  $421
   $183 $189 $273 $268
          
EAST $3,181 $2,965 $216  $13
   $325 $510 $577 $617
          
NORTH $3,292 $3,727 -$436  -$510
   $327 $430 $534 $551
          
Santo Domingo  $3,687 $2,712 $975  $781
   $243 $216 $338 $320
          
SOUTHWEST $2,287 $2,065 $223  $12
   $270 $224 $358 $326
        
Notes: standard errors in italics.  See note to table 2.  The dependent variable is monthly 
earnings (including 0’s for non-earners).  The value of earnings is censored at the 99
th 
percentile.  32
Table 4:  Hours of Work Per Week in the Follow-up Survey 
    
      Raw  Re-weighted 
Muestra Treatments  Controls  Difference  Difference 
          
All 23.97 23.39 0.58 -0.73
   0.94 1.14 1.47 1.47
          
Men 32.50 32.38 0.12 -0.99
   1.46 1.81 2.31 2.35
          
Women 17.09 16.67 0.42 -0.54
   1.13 1.34 1.74 1.73
          
Ages 17 - 19   20.53 21.02 -0.49 -1.65
   2.20 2.85 3.54 3.49
          
Ages 20 - 24   24.59 22.57 2.02 0.80
   1.26 1.49 1.97 1.98
          
Age 25+  24.87 26.34 -1.47 -2.77
   1.84 2.15 2.83 2.78
          
Primary Education  24.00 24.27 -0.27 -2.02
   1.69 2.04 2.62 2.54
          
Secondary Education  23.96 22.88 1.08 0.02
   1.13 1.35 1.78 1.80
          
EAST 27.12 25.60 1.52 0.37
   2.39 3.91 4.33 4.73
          
NORTH 22.70 26.78 -4.07 -3.81
   1.94 2.63 3.21 3.34
          
Santo Domingo  25.72 23.11 2.61 1.33
   1.51 1.72 2.29 2.26
          
SOUTHWEST 19.07 20.50 -1.44 -2.95
   1.88 1.95 2.72 2.57
        
Notes: standard errors in italics.  See note to table 2.  The dependent variable is weekly 
hours (including 0’s for non-workers).    33
 
Table 5:  Summary of Labor Market Outcomes in the Follow-up Survey 
      
      
      Raw  Re-weighted 
Outcome: Treatments  Controls  Difference  Difference 
        
Employment Rate  57.38% 55.95% 1.43% 0.02%
   1.77% 2.09% 2.74% 2.74%
        
Monthly Income (All Jobs)   $            5,818    $            5,289    $               529    $               438  
    $               195    $               202    $               288    $               284  
        
Hours worked per week (All Jobs)  43.43 44.27 -0.84 -1.11
   0.79 0.98 1.25 1.27
        
Hourly Wage (All Jobs)   $          151.19    $          133.92    $            17.27    $            14.50  
    $              9.91    $              7.02    $            13.32    $            11.84  
        
Health Insurance in Primary Job  38.0% 34.8% 3.1% 2.5%
   2.5% 2.9% 3.9% 3.9%
      
Notes: standard errors in italics.  See note to table 2.  The sample for employment includes everyone. The sample  
for income, hours per week, hourly wage, and health insurance includes those with positive earnings and 
between 10 and 85 hours per week.  The value of earnings is censored at the 99
th percentile.  34
Table 6a:  Unadjusted Difference For Selected Indicators   
         
     Monthly  Hours per       Hourly    Health 
   Employment Earnings  Week        Wage    Insurance 
All  1.43% $           529  -0.84 $        17.27   3.1%
   2.74% $           288   1.25 $        13.32   3.9%
           
Men  0.40% $           757  -0.33 $        23.33   9.3%
   3.81% $           406   1.58 $        21.74   5.2%
           
Women  1.41% $           177  -1.66 $          8.07   -5.3%
   3.67% $           360   1.96 $        10.35   5.7%
           
Ages 17 - 19   7.78% $        1,164  -3.42 $        33.49   6.9%
   6.45% $           751   2.70 $        17.47   9.8%
           
Ages 20 - 24   1.48% $           379  0.83 $        17.05   -0.8%
   3.75% $           369   1.69 $        21.08   5.2%
           
Age 25+  -3.42% $           552  -2.48 $        10.27   8.2%
   5.05% $           577   2.44 $        19.72   7.0%
           
Primary Education  -0.37% $           429  -0.08 $        12.15   3.4%
   4.70% $           476   2.32 $        12.75   6.4%
           
Secondary Education  2.40% $           528  -1.24 $        18.01   2.6%
   3.38% $           360   1.48 $        18.99   4.8%
           
EAST  8.48% $          -872 -7.08 $          3.24   -17.6%
   7.25% $           760   3.70 $        15.80   10.7%
           
NORTH  -6.89% $          -140 -0.21 $       -10.53  8.1%
   6.39% $           698   2.68 $        20.24   8.1%
           
Santo Domingo  5.34% $           858  -1.94 $        38.73   9.5%
   4.09% $           445   1.87 $        26.98   5.9%
           
SOUTHWEST  -5.81% $           969  3.00 $          2.43   -2.9%
   5.73% $           523   2.63 $        16.73   8.4%
    
Notes: standard errors in italics. See notes to Table 5.     35
 
Table 6b: Reweighted Differences for Selected Indicators   
         
     Monthly  Hours per       Hourly    Health 
   Employment Earnings  Week        Wage    Insurance 
All  0.02% $           438  -1.11 $        14.50   2.5%
   2.74% $           284   1.27 $        11.84   3.9%
           
Men  -0.77% $           698  -0.41 $        20.16   9.3%
   3.85% $           399   1.62 $        19.09   5.2%
           
Women  0.28% $             90  -2.04 $          6.91   -6.4%
   3.65% $           359   1.99 $        10.38   5.8%
           
Ages 17 - 19   6.93% $           912  -3.79 $        29.01   7.5%
   6.35% $           731   2.72 $        17.22   9.5%
           
Ages 20 - 24   -0.10% $           342  0.86 $        13.90   -0.3%
   3.80% $           367   1.74 $        17.93   5.4%
           
Age 25+  -4.46% $           427  -3.14 $        10.53   4.9%
   5.00% $           555   2.45 $        20.24   6.9%
           
Primary Education  -1.99% $           353  -0.77 $        12.73   3.2%
   4.59% $           452   2.28 $        11.73   6.3%
           
Secondary Education  1.16% $           500  -1.29 $        15.98   2.3%
   3.43% $           362   1.52 $        17.41   4.9%
           
EAST  6.95% $          -990 -7.12 $          0.80   -18.0%
   7.50% $           827   3.92 $        15.15   11.3%
           
NORTH  -6.70% $          -233 0.43 $       -15.21  8.4%
   6.41% $           737   2.72 $        21.95   8.2%
           
Santo Domingo  4.13% $           803  -2.32 $        35.73   8.5%
   4.09% $           414   1.88 $        21.85   5.8%
           
SOUTHWEST  -7.46% $           794  2.22 $          0.10   -4.4%
   5.60% $           504   2.58 $        16.22   8.2%
Notes: standard errors in italics. See notes to Table 5.   36
Table 7: Employability Model - Estimated Parameters 
 
                                    Employed with 
                     Employment     Health Insurance  
 
Model Parameters 
1. Constant (β0)      -1.99    -2.43 
       (3.43)    (4.36) 
 
2. Trend (β1)         0.06    -0.03 
       (0.02)    (0.03) 
 
3. State-dependence (λ)       4.67    7.00 
       (0.15)    (0.31) 
 
4. Treatment Effect if Not Employed in     0.03       0.24 
     Previous Period (ϕ0)     (0.10)    (0.20) 
 
5. Treatment Effect if Employed in        0.13       0.18 
     Previous Period (ϕx1)     (0.14)    (0.27) 
 
6. Treatment Effect in Probability of      0.07        0.18 
     Employment in Month 8 (δ)    (0.15)    (0.27) 
 
7.  Male Dummy in Employment Model       0.73        0.71 
         (0.11)    (0.27) 
 
8.  Dummy for Age 20-24 in Employment        0.37        0.41 
       Model              (0.11)     (0.20) 
 
9.  Dummy for Age 25+ in Employment         0.60       0.57 
       Model               (0.13)    (0.25) 
 
10. Loading Factor For Covariates in Model       1.33       1.89 
        for Employment in Month 8 (µ)         (0.26)     (0.66) 
 
11.    Log  Likelihood      -  3630.7   -  1536.3 
 
12.  Total Number of Parameters         17          17 
 
 
Note: Models include point-mass random effects, with three points of support.  See text. 
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Figure 1. Employment Rates 
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Figure 3. Actual and Simulated Treatment Effects on Probability of Employment 
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